Zionism and the Litani: A colonial hydro-political ambition

The struggle over water in the Lebanon–Palestine border cannot be detached from the broader architecture of colonial power that shaped the modern ‘Middle East’. From the moment Britain and France imposed the 1923 borders, the Zionist movement regarded the rivers of southern Lebanon — especially the Litani — as essential components of its settler-colonial project. This was not merely a technical dispute over irrigation; it was a geopolitical contest in which water became both a symbol and an instrument of expansion. As a Lebanese researcher committed to sovereignty and opposed to Zionist encroachments, it is impossible for me to read this history without recognising how deeply hydro-politics informed the logic of dispossession that later culminated in occupation and repeated wars.

Zionist frustration: the Litani placed beyond reach deep inside Lebanon

Between 1923 and 1968, water remained at the heart of Zionist objections to the Anglo-French boundary line. That line — drawn with typical colonial indifference — placed the entire Litani River within Lebanese territory, a mere four kilometres from the frontier. For Zionist schemers, this was a profound loss. Their most ambitious plan for agricultural colonisation relied upon diverting part of the Litani River eastward into the Hasbani River, feeding the Jordan River and ultimately irrigating the Negev. The British–French agreements made no allowance for such a diversion. The proposed commission to study the joint use of the Hasbani was never formed. The early hydro-political field was shaped by absence: no cooperation, no shared governance, no recognition of Lebanon’s rights.

Ironically, Lebanon did not initially benefit from Zionism’s failure. The French mandate hardly made use of the river as it sacrificed the industry and agriculture sectors in favour of the services sector. By 1936, irrigation was confined to small pockets, and hydroelectric potential was ignored. Zionist strategists watched carefully. To them, Lebanon’s limited use of the Litani was wasteful. They considered this ‘evidence’ that the river should be integrated into Zionist regional plans. Studies in the 1930s and 1940s encouraged this view. For example, an American University of Beirut study on electricity suggested there is utility for the northern parts of Palestine. A 1943 ‘joint’ Lebanese–Zionist survey went further, recommending that most of the Litani be diverted into Palestine, with Lebanon compensated in electricity. For Zionists, the Litani remained central to the dream of making the Negev bloom.

Lebanon’s first attempted occupation in 1948

The Nakba dramatically altered the political landscape. Lebanon, already fragile internally, could not risk the stigma of supplying “Arab water” to a Zionist state built on dispossession. Lebanon profited from the economic effects of the Arab boycott, and the United Nations’ 1949 survey showed that Lebanon could use far more of the Litani than the 1943 report assumed. Cooperation became politically toxic. Any Lebanese government willing to sell water to Israel would face internal revolt and Arab outrage. Hydro-politics was no longer a technical issue — it had become an arena of anti-colonial struggle.

Israel showed little sympathy for Lebanon’s delicate position. During the 1948 war, its forces occupied territory near the bend of the Litani. They withdrew in 1949 only because they expected Lebanon to sign a peace treaty — wishful strategic thinking. The episode underscored the same pattern: Israel intended to secure water resources through force whenever diplomacy failed. What Zionist planners had imagined acquiring through agreements, they now sought through occupation.

Israel’s 1953 attempt to divert the Jordan River sparked international outcry, leading to American intervention. The Johnston Mission sought a multilateral water agreement. Its “Main Plan” accepted Lebanon’s insistence that the Litani was a national river, excluding it from the scheme. Israel countered with the Cotton Plan, arguing that Lebanon needed only half its water and should sell the remainder. Yet Israel had no legal claim: the Litani lies wholly within Lebanese territory. Lebanon’s internal politics made cooperation impossible. Any deal would provoke Arab backlash and internal instability.

Zionist hydro-political dreams begin to crumble

By 1955, Israel abandoned its claim to the Litani and adjusted its negotiating stance. The premise that had guided Zionist strategy since the early twentieth century — control of the Litani, diversion to the Negev, regional hydro-political leverage — was slowly collapsing. What remained was frustration, a sense of thwarted ambition that would later influence Israel’s aggressive posture toward southern Lebanon.

The first phase of the water controversy reveals a structured pattern of colonial hydropolitics: Zionist pursuit of Lebanese water, Lebanon’s attempt to maintain sovereignty amidst immense pressure, and the transformation of water into a central front of resistance. This was not a dispute over engineering. It was a struggle over land, population, and the legitimacy of a settler-colonial project. The Litani, placed just beyond Zionist reach, became a symbol of Lebanon’s precarious autonomy and of the enduring contest between regional sovereignty and expansionist ambition.

Featured image via Wikimedia Commons