The Engineering of the Belt and the Land

Hardly had the Second World War drawn its heavy curtains when Levantine and regional politics spun back into a vortex of bewilderment and existential struggle, causing widespread destruction across Palestine and Lebanon.

This was the inevitable detonation of the Arab-Zionist conflict over the identity and future of the historic land of Palestine. Exhausted economically and politically by the fallout of the global war, Great Britain found its continued position as a mandatory power in Palestine untenable. It could no longer withstand the blows of the Arab resistance and Zionist insurgent operations.

Following its absolute failure in February 1947 to reach any mutually acceptable political settlement, London decided to abandon the file entirely and cast it into the lap of the newly established United Nations, calling upon the international body to handle the issue.

The Partition Resolution and the Rejected Border Map

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly approved the historic Resolution 181, which explicitly called for:

the partition of Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish States, bound by a close economic union, and the establishment of a special international regime and international trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem.

The Arab states and Palestinian leadership swiftly rejected the resolution in its entirety, viewing it as a stab into the heart of the nation. They publicly vowed to prevent its implementation on the ground, even if compelled to deploy total military force.

Yet, a meticulous geopolitical reading of the 1947 partition map reveals that, had it been implemented operationally, its structural impact on the shape and nature of the border between Palestine and Lebanon would have been profound and radical.

According to the precise terms and demarcations of the resolution, that long stretch of the 1923 international frontier – extending from the Mediterranean coast at Ras al-Naqoura in the west to a point situated immediately north of the Palestinian village of Salha in the east – would have fallen entirely under the sovereignty and authority of the proposed independent Arab Palestinian State.

Along the coastline, Arab jurisdiction and sovereignty were intended to stretch from Ras al-Naqoura in the far northwest down to the city of Acre in the south, while its northern interior sector was to reach a strategic point located directly south of the city of Nazareth.

It is patently clear how completely the Palestinian side of the sensitive border zone adjacent to Lebanon would have been altered by the execution of this resolution. The district of Safad – a geographical zone that had occupied a prominent and central position in the arduous post-WWI Anglo-French border negotiations due to Zionist insistence on integrating the existing Jewish settlements established there – was consciously excluded by the resolution to be subsequently incorporated into the proposed borders of the projected Jewish State.

This was done despite the undeniable fact that a crushing and decisive majority of the indigenous population were Arabs who held both the land and its history.

Beirut’s Territorial Ambitions

Nevertheless, armed Arab opposition and categorical political rejection ensured that the international partition resolution would never find a peaceful path to execution.

As the British Mandate approached its formal and dramatic termination in May 1948, security and military conditions along the border line between Palestine and Lebanon rapidly degenerated into the exact same state of absolute chaos and clashes that had prevailed during the Great Arab Revolt between 1936 and 1939.

An irregular, volunteer Arab military force known as the ‘Arab Liberation Army’ (or the Salvation Army), led by the military commander Fawzi al-Qawuqji – one of the most prominent leaders and combatants of the 1936 revolt – was operating dynamically and fighting fiercely on both sides of the Upper Galilee border. Meanwhile, South Lebanon, which by then had become a part of the newly independent Lebanese Republic, was transformed once again by the force of nationalist ties into a safe haven, a logistical supply base, and a vital launching pad for Arab fighter incursions against Zionist colonies.

As had been the case a decade earlier, the Lebanese entity in Beirut, with its fragile sectarian architecture, appeared neither willing nor militarily capable of intervening to regulate or prevent the commando and resistance operations against targets in Palestine, which were launched freely from its southern territories.

Much like the surrounding sister Arab states, the ruling elite in Lebanon harboured serious doubts and anxieties regarding the capacity of the Palestinians to establish an independent and viable Arab state within a fragmented Palestine. Furthermore, mirroring the fraternal Arab governments that acted on tactical nationalist and expansionist motives, Lebanon officially coveted the acquisition of certain lands and geographical zones at the expense of mandated Palestine to expand its own borders.

The 1948 Invasion of Lebanon

Consequently, the government in Beirut took the decision to utilise the small Lebanese Army to support and supply Qawuqji’s forces. They hoped that, if there were to be a partition and carving up of Arab Palestine, Beirut could at the very least claim the historical and geographical annexation of the Upper Galilee to Lebanese sovereignty. However, there were clear political and military limits to Lebanon’s military commitment in the battle to ‘save’ Palestine.

Possessing a regular army that was highly limited in size and efficiency – designed and armed primarily for the requirements of maintaining internal security and suppressing local unrest – Lebanon was not in a military position to conduct sustained offensive operations or wage a wide war of attrition in Palestine. Accordingly, its direct military involvement in the struggle for Palestine was mostly symbolic, functioning as a calculated political manoeuvre to secure the maximum possible political and territorial gains while expending the minimum of military effort and sacrifice.

From the perspective of the Zionist military command, which was fighting an existential battle, there were three clear tactical routes and axes of advance leading from Lebanon into the depth of Palestine:

1. on the left flank from Ras al-Naqoura, moving directly along the coastal line toward the city of Acre;
2. through the central sector stretching from the environs of Bint Jbeil to any number of border crossings;
3. and on the right flank through the strategic Hula Valley via Marj’ayoun and Metula.

However, as the military historian Sacher noted in his analyses:

the lines of communication … were not favourable to an attack; the roads through the Galilee ran from west to east, not from north to south, so an advance from Lebanon faced immense logistical hurdles and challenges.

With the occupation of the Palestinian border post at Ras al-Naqoura on 24 May 1948 by a detachment of the Lebanese Army, we observe that Lebanon’s actual and direct role in the First Arab-Israeli War was tactically restricted and reduced to the narrow Bint Jbeil border sector.

On 15 May 1948, the very first day of Israel’s self-proclaimed independence, two Lebanese infantry battalions and an armoured company attacked and overran the small border settlement of Malikiyya, successfully uprooting its garrison. This rapid military incursion officially placed Lebanon in direct, dangerous opposition to the United Nations partition plan, as Malikiyya was located within the zone designated by the UN as part of the projected Zionist Jewish State.

The Israeli Backlash in the Deep South

Just three days after the resounding fall of Malikiyya, the Israeli forces launched a counter-offensive characterised by audacity and unconventional planning.

A small, highly mobile and mechanised Israeli force entered deep into Lebanese territory near the northern village of Odaysah, approximately eighteen kilometres north of the fortified Malikiyya crossing. The Israeli force pushed southward into the Lebanese interior, bypassing and threatening the towns of Markaba, Houla, Meiss El-Jabal, and Blida with a complete disregard for sovereignty. South of Blida, the Israelis wheeled sharply to the southeast and re-entered Palestine, taking the Lebanese garrison stationed at Malikiyya entirely by surprise and isolating it through a clever tactical outflanking manoeuvre from the rear, thereby recapturing the position.

The Lebanese Army responded to the loss of Malikiyya by launching its only genuine, organised combat operation on 6 June 1948, successfully storming Malikiyya and overrunning an additional small settlement the following day: Kadesh-Naftali. According to the historical military analysis by O’Ballance:

That attack on Malikiyya was the sole Lebanese success during the war. The assault was carried out by an infantry force numbering about 800 men, supported only by mortars. Not much can be deduced from this incident, as the victory was perhaps due to overwhelming numbers more than anything else.

In any event, that limited operation did nothing to bolster Lebanon’s resolve, or at least enhance its proficiency in major theatres of war.

Following its localised victory at the Battle of Malikiyya, Lebanon quietly and prudently retired from any active participation or assaults in the war, surrendering its gains and positions in the central sector entirely to the irregular Arab Liberation Army. At the conclusion of the first Arab-Israeli truce (9 July 1948), limited Lebanese forces were deployed in the border area of Bint Jbeil and just a few metres from the border in the ‘Arab’ sector of Palestine at Ras al-Naqoura.

Yet, Lebanon subsequently found that severing its connection and isolating itself from the fierce war raging in Palestine was neither easy nor permissible. Israel was resolute and determined to acquire the maximum possible amount of mandated Palestine and secure its frontiers.

Operation Hiram

In October 1948, the Israeli forces launched a sweeping military campaign aimed at completely clearing northern Palestine of the Arab Liberation Army’s presence, dubbing the assault ‘Operation Hiram’ after the ancient king of Tyre from the biblical era.

The operation represented a brilliant and unambiguous Israeli military success. The Arab Liberation Army was forced to abandon all its fortified positions in the Galilee and retreat chaotically into the Lebanese region of Bint Jbeil. The Israeli forces did not stop there, but pursued the defeated enemy deep into the Lebanese interior.

The Lebanese Army, exercising extreme caution and prudence, refrained from taking any combat stance or engaging the invading Israelis to avoid its own destruction. The Zionist forces found themselves in complete military control of eighteen occupied southern Lebanese villages, consolidating their presence across a wide area running parallel to the Manara road up to Wadi Douba and the Litani River. In the Zionist consciousness, this territory represented the natural geographical and historical borders of the entire Upper Galilee region.

Ben-Gurion and the Armistice Agreement

Finally, translating the dreams of long decades into reality, the Zionists managed to secure a solid, strategic military foothold on the banks of the Litani River. From that moment on, everything within Israeli political and military circles pointed toward a firm and final determination to retain and annex the captured Lebanese lands.

In late 1948, intensive and coordinated claims emerged in Israeli diplomatic and press circles asserting that the occupied Lebanese villages were demanding to be placed under the authority and protection of the Israeli army, and that a pro-Zionist Christian ‘Free Lebanese Movement’ was active inside Israel to justify the total annexation of Lebanese territories by Israel.

However, rather than risking a forced alteration of its northern borders and confronting the international community, Israel adopted an alternative, highly astute political strategy: bartering the occupied Lebanese lands in exchange for major political concessions and border security.

In early 1949, Israeli leaders believed they could conclude an attractive, unilateral peace settlement with the Christian-dominated Lebanese state. They assumed that such treaties would not only secure Israel’s historic access to the waters of the Litani River, but would also further fragment and isolate the Arab world by permanently detaching Lebanon from the Arab alliance.

On 21 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, recorded and summarised this strategic vision in his diary, stating:

The Achilles’ heel of the Arab coalition is Lebanon. Muslim supremacy in this country is artificial and can be easily overthrown. A Christian state ought to be set up there, with its southern frontier on the Litani River. We would sign an alliance treaty with this state.

As a practical demonstration of this vision, Israeli negotiators entered the negotiation arena fully aware that they could obtain either the Litani as territory or a political treaty, but not both simultaneously.

Consequently, when formal armistice talks with Lebanon commenced under United Nations auspices in January 1949, Israel displayed a high degree of readiness that resembled an eager desire to relinquish the Lebanese territories it controlled. It swiftly withdrew from four occupied Lebanese villages in exchange for a minimal, symbolic Lebanese withdrawal from the Israeli side of Ras al-Naqoura.

Nevertheless, several weeks of deadlock ensued as Israel attempted to link its complete withdrawal from Lebanon to a Syrian withdrawal from a small pocket of Palestinian territory in the Hula Valley. The two issues were eventually uncoupled under international pressure, and on 23 March 1949, the General Armistice Agreement was formally signed between Israel and Lebanon.

Deconstructing Homogeneity

The armistice was not a permanent peace treaty; it left Lebanon and Israel in a state of technical warfare under international law, although its signing was viewed within Israel as:

the penultimate step toward comprehensive peace.

Guided by the terms of the agreement, the Israeli forces withdrew from Lebanon behind the Armistice Demarcation Line, the purpose of which was to define the line beyond which the armed forces of both parties must never pass. The agreement stipulated that ‘the Armistice Demarcation Line follows the international boundary between Lebanon and Palestine’ as originally drawn in 1923.

The armistice agreement did not stop at restoring the border along its designated line, but imposed strict and specific military restrictions to be observed on both sides of the armistice line. The text called for the deployment of ‘defensive forces only’ in the armistice line zone to prohibit any mutual aggression. These ‘Defensive Forces’ were defined in the annex to the Armistice Agreement with mathematical and military precision as follows:

On the part of Lebanon:

• Two battalions and two companies of the regular Lebanese Army infantry;
• a field battery of 4 guns;
• a single company consisting of 12 light armoured cars armed with machine guns; and
• 6 light tanks armed with light guns (a total of 20 vehicles), with the total number of officers and enlisted men not exceeding 1,500 personnel.

No other military forces whatsoever were permitted to be deployed or utilised south of the general line: Qasimiya – Nabatieh al-Tahta – Hasbaya. This effectively rendered South Lebanon a zone demilitarised of heavy and offensive weaponry, with the closest point where Lebanese offensive forces could be stationed being approximately twelve kilometres north of Metula near the village of Blat.

In the case of Israel:

• One infantry battalion;
• a support company with six mortars, six machine guns, and six armoured vehicles;
• a single reconnaissance company;
• six armoured jeeps;
• a field artillery battalion of four guns, a platoon of field engineers, and logistical units, with the total not exceeding 1,500 officers and men.

No other military forces were permitted north of the general line: Nahariya – Tarshiha – Al-Jish – Marus. Under these conditions, Israel was permitted to concentrate its offensive forces in the Hula Valley region to confront the Syrians, and the General Armistice Agreement made absolutely no mention of the paramilitary forces garrisoned within the newly established Zionist Jewish settlements being constructed right along the armistice line.

Constructing the Belt

While the demilitarisation of South Lebanon succeeded in alleviating Israeli anxiety regarding a potential conventional military threat from the north, the forced demographic transformation in northern Israel came to be viewed as the true, radical solution to the problem of irregular warfare and the dilemma of ethnic homogeneity previously exposed by Tegart’s Wall. Thousands of Arab farmers had fled to Lebanon from northern Palestine under the weight of the 1948 battles and operations, and the Zionist state moved rapidly to convert their abandoned villages adjacent to the Lebanese border into fortified, militarily armed Israeli settlements.

During the years spanning 1948 to 1950, a dense chain of these settlements was established, and the Arabs who were still living near the border were expelled and displaced purely for security purposes. The goal was to create an exclusively Jewish security and ethnic belt stretching across northern Israel to ensure that any possibility of infiltration was severed. In this regard, the Israeli Attorney-General in 1972 clearly summarised this Zionist security philosophy, stating:

We do not want Arab villages near the Lebanese border; we do not want to provide an opportunity for them to establish contact with the Arabs on the other side.

Accordingly, the government barred the Arabs who had been expelled from the border villages of Iqrit and Kafr Bir’im in 1948 from returning, despite their loyalty and the service of their youth within the Israeli military.

In short, the immediate military effect of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement was the complete pacification of Zionist anxieties regarding the defence of their northern border. Lebanon, which had barely posed an offensive threat at the best of times, was barred from deploying any forces of substance, while Israel succeeded in transforming its side of the frontier into a chain of fortified strongholds.

The historic ethnic homogeneity of the border zone was erased, and the fear of invasion was eliminated, temporarily closing the battlefield of South Lebanon. Yet, in 1949, Israel failed to foresee that the absence of a strong, organised Lebanese presence south of the Litani would ultimately become its next security nightmare.

Featured image via Wikimedia